West and the Rest: Dismantling dominant Western-centric thought in global justice.
This standard of West-centric justice, where the rich ‘save’ the poor, populates many concerns, however foremostly cements the rich West prerogative and power hierarchy, eventually sustaining the status quo of the poor remaining at the bottom.
Introduction: The problem of West-centric ethics and inequality
A well-known study by the World Institute for Development Economics Research at United Nations University reported that the wealthiest 1% of adults alone owned 40% of global assets in the year 2000. The bottom half of the world adult population owned 1% of global wealth. But who is the “bottom” and the “top”? Most people living in absolute poverty belong to two regions: Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (United Nations Population Division, 2018) but only occupy 5% of global wealth. And the “top” is not just the richest 1% — the West occupies 20% of the world’s population and controls over two thirds of the world’s income. This translates to the average family in a Western country like the United States, being 60 times richer than the average family in Ethiopia (Birdsall 1998, 76).
Illustration by O.O.P.S. Photographs from Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer / Getty (workers); Getty (money) for The New Yorker.
Despite these prominent wealth patterns, few of the major accounts of global justice draw upon or examine accounts of justice from outside the traditional West-centric justice frameworks, and therefore cannot account for a truly pluralist view, of which global ethics should account for, as it would seem natural that a global ethics is not West-centric, but global. Next to this, many scholars have argued that global inequality is produced and sustained by economic structures that benefitted mainly early industrializers (Kohn 2013, 190). This standard of West-centric justice, where the rich ‘save’ the poor, populates many concerns, however foremostly cements the rich West prerogative and power hierarchy, eventually sustaining the status quo of the poor remaining at the bottom.
This paper was triggered by and attempts to answer Margaret Kohn’s enquiry in her 2013 paper ‘Postcolonialism and Global Justice’: “is it possible to advance a philosophical argument that seeks to convince the privileged of their obligations without invoking a rhetoric that demeans or dehumanizes the poor?”. This delivers the following proposition:
■ Global inequality exists
■ Global inequality exists due to industrialised, rich, mostly Western nations
■ Rich nations follow Western ethics, maintaining power imbalance
■ However, a global community should be totally addressed in its ethics
■ Therefore, a global ethics framework should accommodate plurality, while still fulfilling the obligations of the privileged to the poor.
On the periphery of Kohn’s question, this paper tries to answer: should we dismantle the dominant Western-centric thought in prominent global justice frameworks? It begins to answer this by providing evidence of dominant West-centric thought in two prominent global justice literature — Rawls’ LoP and Cosmopolitanism — and identifies a total of 5 key problems that they derive. This is followed with counter arguments that challenge the premise that West-centric global justice is problematic. Having addressed the counter arguments, the paper then outlines alternative existing frameworks that could address the overly West-centric approaches, while still fulfilling the obligations of the privileged to the poor.
West-centric evidence in key global justice frameworks
Framework 1: Rawls account of international justice
Though this paper does not have time to deeply outline each framework, I will (very) briefly sketch an account of John Rawls view of international justice, and then unpack the irksome Western-centric features. Rawls develops a set of principles for international justice, which he calls the law of peoples (LoP). The LOP principles are developed through a version of his original position (OP) argument. The argument evolves into two steps. In the first step, citizens determine a just domestic setup. Then, peoples — politically organized communities, linked by just democratic institutions, a common culture and a moral nature — unite in the second OP. In this second OP, representatives of peoples, cast as equal and rational, determine principles for the LoP (Rawls 1999, 33–34). From this, the principles that emerge engage a finite set of human rights, as well as the conservation of the sovereignty of societies that foster those rights. The resulting LoP is an overwhelmingly liberal idea of foreign policy.
From this, we can already diagnose two shortcomings in Rawls’s theory, shortcomings that root his thinking in limiting West-centric boundaries, thereby impacting its dealings with all marginalized groups (Nussbaum 2002, 285).
The first shortcoming is that the theory does not support redistribution of wealth and income from richer to poorer nations (Nussbaum 2002; Pogge 1994; Buchanan 2000). The difference principle, a key fairness concept from his earlier Theory of Justice, applies globally, within each society, but is not global in reach. Neither his work in Political Liberalism (1993) nor The Law of Peoples (1993) renovates this position (Freeman 2008, 1). This is problematic for two reasons: firstly, for individuals from one area of the world who are violated and deprived of basic life chances, we might expect that a theory of international justice would recognise their position, and require a global redistribution of wealth and income (Nussbaum 2002, 286) to mitigate their experience. Secondly, the point Rawls is trying to make is that the aim of the LoP is to accomplish internal justice of all members of society (Soniewicka 2008, 53) however, with this he fails to recognise that even self-sufficient societies influence each other on an external global scale, determining ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. This also speaks to the German philosopher Thomas Pogge’s argument in An Egalitarian Law of Peoples (1994) addressing the arbitrariness of national borders in the LoP, in which he describes most borders have developed through violence and coercion (Ibid, 198).
This failure to support global redistribution maintains the problem of Western dominance, leaving the global poor to ‘figure it out themselves’, of which many do not have the resources or tools to do so, and may abandon them to Rawls’ ‘outlaw’ status. Outlaw nations are rogue. They compromise peace by trying to expand their power or by threatening the human rights of those within their borders. The principles of the LoP allow others to fight these outlaw states in self-defense, however, the LoP does not recognise why these outlaw states might exist — becoming rogue could result from poverty stemming from unjust global distribution — of which Rawls ironically disregards in his theory, maintaining a Western dominance that is dangerous to an effective global justice.
The second shortcoming in the LoP is that Rawls emphatically embraces political liberalism, “as a response to a peculiarly Western historical experience” (Nussbaum 2002, 287). It is a natural position for him since he conceives of the LoP as the product
of extending a liberal notion of justice to the inter-societal plane (Tasioulas 2002, 368), where even the very first requirement of the theory demands that an international justice is not limited in their range of acceptability to Western societies (Ibid, 391). Because of the importance of liberty in the liberal doctrine, the question of intervention in a foreign country becomes challenging. The principle of allowing freedom to individuals on the domestic level also applies to states on the international level and when these principles collide, for example in the case of human rights violations, the answer will not be straight forward (Sjöblom 2016, 3).
This heavy liberal positioning is problematic in two ways. Firstly, the liberal kernel speaks to a key concept of the LoP — tolerance. Tolerance, being an already loaded use of language, is a tool for liberal societies to accept non-liberal ones. Liberal societies will be favoured as more ‘reasonable’ as opposed to, say, hierarchical societies, and certainly more favoured than outlaw states. Liberal peoples tolerate decent peoples, and treat them as equals (not the other way around, mind you). Rawls is clear that a decent hierarchical society is morally inferior since it is not “as just as a liberal one”, and it “does not treat its own members reasonably or justly as free and equal citizens, since it lacks the liberal idea of citizenship” (LoP, 83). And even though Rawls did not want to impose liberal values, he does incentivise them, thereby favouring West-centric values rooted in liberalism. Secondly, this liberal favouring is troubling because it further cements the concept of ‘the other’ by the conceptual division of the world into ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’, or ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’, which is surely incorrect — suggesting a singleness where in fact there is a complex diversity (Nussbaum 2002, 287). ‘Non-Western’ is clearly a Western artefact which collects civilizations of some of the poorest global regions namely East Asia, South Asia and Africa (Ibid, 288). Banishing poverty stricken areas of the globe as not West, has damaging ideological ramifications, detaching those with less as not shared in identity with ‘the West’, and as a ‘non’. Although I do not have time to argue for what the new terminology might pertain — and I continue to use it in this paper to demonstrate its complication — I do recognise it requires a renovation.
Having reviewed some key West-centric issues with Rawls’ LoP, we can see how a domineering liberal perspective may not properly recognise other societies that are not formed from liberal roots, yet do contribute to a total global identity. I will now review a second key global justice theory, Cosmopolitanism, and demonstrate its West-centric worries.
West-centric evidence in key global justice frameworks
Framework 2: Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitanism has many interpretations. “[C]osmopolitanism is … a contested term; there is no uniform interpretation of it in the growing literature” (Beck 2006, 2). However, Cosmopolitanism is generally linked to globalisation and refers to a world political community, which involves ‘world-building’…rather than ‘nation-building’ (Go 2013, 4). Considering the many versions, I will focus on the transnational institutions view (TIV) as well as Pogge’s response to Rawls’ LoP, which also includes Cosmopolitan views. I will then outline how Pogge’s TIV and LoP response remain West-centric, and therefore also problematic theories, even though they try to improve upon Rawls’ approach.
Briefly outlining the TIV view, developed by Pogge, it can be shortly understood as a “political project towards building transnational institutions that promote frameworks and institutions beyond the nation-state, such as the UN and the EU on one side, or social movements that are transnational, such as environmental movements” (Kaunonen 2014, 17).
On Pogge’s criticisms against the LoP, in An Egalitarian Law of Peoples (1994) Pogge argues against Rawls in broadly two ways, borrowing from his strongly Cosmopolitan perspective. Firstly, he dismantles the two-step model as incompatible ideal theories and demands a single global original position (Ibid, 197) to replace the two-step model. Secondly, Pogge criticizes Rawls’ exclusion of distributive justice from the global arena, born from the premise that if there is a global basic structure, then there should be global distributive justice (Buchanan 2000; Pogge 1994). From these points Pogge puts forward an egalitarian LoP, with a key concept to illustrate it: a Global Resource Tax (GRT). A GRT means that, while peoples own the resources within its national borders, it can only through a tax on those it chooses to extract. The earnings should then be directed toward lifting the present and future global poor (Pogge 1994).
How do these views remain West-centric and therefore problematic? Next to being obviously resoundingly liberal, they fulfill this in two key ways: the problem of individualism; and the problem of hegemony of liberally dominant institutions. Firstly, though not unique to Pogge’s brand of Cosmopolitanism yet central to TIV, a key feature of Cosmopolitanism is the promotion of individuals and therefore the application of human rights. This focus on individuals also shapes a key difference to Rawls’ articulation of peoples. Go (2013) defines Cosmopolitanism “as a worldwide community that takes individuals rather than nations, tribes, or races as the guiding principle.” Focusing on the individual and what is universalizable is neo-Kantian, where Cosmopolitanism can become vulnerable to downgrading national or local loyalties, and ignoring religious belonging. Individualism is a distinctly Western view, and can conflict with other global members’ practices. For example, in the Global South, community group membership is highly prized, where a dominating promotion of individualism could prove incompatible with centuries-old structures and cultures. A global justice literature could therefore gain from including not only individual perspectives, but also communitarian ones.
Secondly, brands of Cosmopolitanism like TIV display hegemonic tendencies that could be interpreted as imperialistic, and “a penchant for monism” (Pieri 2014, 24). The very advocacy of international regulatory bodies and transnational institutions, frameworks and networks (from the UN to environmentalism) could be extensions of interests particular to the liberal and Western agenda. As further articulated by Pieri, “the staging of an international civic society of elite nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) at UN World Conferences can become an alibi for economic transnationalism, which is often US economic nationalism in disguise” (Ibid, 26).
Alternative frameworks to global justice
Having established that both Rawls and Pogge prominent global justice frameworks suffer from a distinctly West-centric view, we can identify the overall problems include a highly liberal and individual agenda. However, the world does not follow only liberal, West-centric formulas and can threaten true global justice through 5 key problems: promoting a single political perspective; creating division language defining ‘the other’; encouraging hegemony; disregarding collectivist features; and showing imperialist tendencies. However, these West-centric problems are not surprising, considering both frameworks have origins born from the wealthy fertile grounds of Europe (Pogge) and the USA (Rawls), and, as identified by French political philosopher Frantz Fanon, these views, especially Cosmopolitanism, spring from areas of the world that have strong colonialist DNA which has perhaps been forgotten in the evolution of these frameworks. This recognition, and those articulated above, are partly addressed by two fairly recently developed areas of thought: Comparative Political Theory (CPT) in political science and Margaret Kohn’s Post-colonial Theory. The combination of these does not solve the West-centric problem per se, and are in fact of Western origin themselves. However, they do recognise that a theory of justice should incorporate non-Western thought, and begin to answer some of the issues discovered in Pogge’s and Rawls’ work.
Comparative Political Theory (CPT)
The intellectual godfather of CPT is political scientist Fred Dallmayr, author of Introduction: Toward a Comparative Political Theory (1997). CPT is a product specifically of the political science discipline, however still develops normative methodologies (Von Vacano, 2015). The blindness to any but Western philosophy is pervasive. In short, CPT promotes drawing from non-Western perspectives. Dallmayr defines CPT as:
“a mode of theorizing that takes seriously the ongoing process of globalization,
a mode which entails, among other things, the growing proximity and interpretation
of cultures…” (2004, 249)
If the most pressing questions of contemporary political philosophy are global, how could a global framework exist (a “planetary political theory” in Dallmayr’s words) except by including a world’s worth of intellectual perspectives? Drawing from the likes of African; West, East and South Asian; and Eastern European thought is no small feat, however brings with it three overwhelming benefits that sharply contrast the colonialist modus operandi: flourishing, collaboration and something I will term ‘post-individualism’ — the recognition of the individual, the group and the community.
By World War I, 90% of the planet was occupied by imperial powers and their colonies (Go 2013, 2). Though the process of decolonization is not complete, societies today should be able to protect their different conceptions of the good, without subscribing to an unaccommodating paternalistic West-based ideology. They may value things like family, community, piety, or excellence more than, for example, wealth. By examining both the scholarly traditions and popular traditions of political thought in industrialised and developing cultures, one can begin to develop a global ethics framework that is robust. This would dismantle the ‘good vs bad’ Manichaeism of colonialism that inhibits true exchange, releasing a new flourishing of humanity (Ibid, 15). In supporting this notion, the collaborative nature of pluralist framework would resemble the position of well-known philosopher Richard Rorty, in that a system that is ‘shaped rather than found’ would serve the difficult task of global cooperation, because people will be loyal to a practice not because it can be shown to be rationally true, but because they have helped shape it (Shapcott 2018). In collaboration, they have ownership of it and it reflects their purposes. Having reviewed CPT, we can determine that by acknowledging and including a broader range of theoretical perspectives, all 5 issues identified earlier — promoting a single political perspective; creating division language defining ‘the other’; encouraging hegemony; disregarding collectivist features; and showing imperialist tendencies — are all addressed in some way.
One might argue that while it may seem logical to include non-Western texts as objects of enquiry within a global justice theory, few have developed a practical and effective methodological approach to do so. In sum, it is too hard. Indeed, though incorporating non-Western theory in a global framework may be time-consuming, long, or difficult, does not discount its value as a tool for a more successful, pluralistic outcome that is sensitive to the pluralism of the globe, and not blind to it. Even shallow enquiry and inclusion of other texts is already a great deal more than what is available today.
Postcolonial Theory (PCT)
Postcolonial theory speaks to the power of language and addresses two key concepts present in colonialism: metaphor and narrative. According to Margaret Kohn, PCT unravels the common and abstract metaphors that are embedded in problematic narratives left behind by colonialism. These concepts unintentionally generate images of, for example, the Global South and its people as “primitive, stagnant, savage, corrupt, incapable, passive, and abject, thereby undermining solidarity and respect and reinforcing rather than dismantling power relations” (Kohn 2013, 188).
In regards to narrative, Kohn points out a sharp analysis by Kenyan-American professor Makau Mutua — that the narrative of human rights depicts Western countries and NGOs as saviours, thereby preserving the Western dominance. People living in under-developed countries are placed in one of two buckets: weak, defenseless victims who must be protected from their own corrupt culture, or “barbaric savages” who incite brutality and corruption (Ibid, 192). And from these narratives, spring metaphors. A metaphor is a word or phrase used to describe something with other words or concepts. For example: to have a heart of gold; or the Third World; or Non-West. In time metaphors become so familiar that they gain such legitimacy, they can become a source for a new metaphor (Ibid, 191).
Postcolonial theorists subscribe to the idea that the developed have a moral responsibility to assist in the deprivation of the under-developed, however, they are concerned that the language supporting this obligation has powerful political impact. These representations are deeply rooted in shaping media including advertising, literature, film and news, and it is through these types of representations that knowledge of other regions is formed and the rhetorical structure that reinforces hierarchical relationships remains (Ibid, 194). To respond to these debilitating representations, Kohn suggests challenging the current language around the poor and rich. For example, a substitute term for “the rich helping the poor” is “solidarity”. This term is used intentionally by the World Social Forum (WSF). Solidarity infers mutual support within a group, as opposed to the persistent hierarchical relationship.
Next to this, not only changing language, but also regularly documenting local initiatives present in communities that incite change, not only their plight, will untangle the hierarchical scarring we know today. Although not all five failures could be addressed by attending to Kohn’s focus on language and metaphor, it does offer a great deal in bringing balance to our understanding of the world.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that core frameworks in global justice are lacking in that they dominate with a West-centric view. By analysing the highly liberal accounts of key global justice frameworks such as Rawls’ LoP and the Cosmopolitanism account, the paper sketched 5 key barriers to a truly global framework: the promoting of a single political perspective; creating division language defining ‘the other’; encouraging hegemony; disregarding collectivist features; and showing imperialist tendencies. In response, a more robust global justice framework should accommodate ‘planetary political thought’, and would address these five failures by including political thought from other cultures; including a post-individualist view that recognise groups and communities as well as individuals; and finally, engaging a change in narrative of developed and under-developed nations by innovating concepts like “West and non-West” or the “West and The Rest”. Looking to newer theories to address these areas, such as Comparative Political Theory and Postcolonial Theory, at least begins to dismantle the reigning moral and political paradigms that ignore the nuances of moral, political, economic and cultural diversity.
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